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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REMOVING A SPLINTER BY AMPUTATING THE LIMB: HOW THE
SEC MISSES THE MARK (AGAIN) ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION WITH THE PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the typical Walmart employee made less in the entire year than
Michael Duke, Walmart’s then-chief executive officer (“CEO”), made on
January 1st alone. 1 In fact, Duke earned more than the typical Walmart
employee’s yearly salary by lunchtime. 2 The Economic Policy Institute (“EPI”)
conducts a study each year determining how much the average CEO makes
compared to the typical employee. 3 In 2000, the ratio of CEO compensation-tomedian employee pay reached an all-time high of 376-to-1. 4 In other words, the
average CEO earned as much in one day as the typical employee of their
company earned in 376 days. In 2016, that ratio dropped to a mere 271-to-1,
which is a definite improvement. 5 However, when the ratio in the United States
is nearly twice as large as those in Switzerland and Germany, and Japanese
CEOs make roughly fifty-eight times what their employees make, 271-to-1
looks very bad. 6
The annual compensation, or “overcompensation” as some would call it, of
American CEOs is not going unnoticed by the American public. A study from
Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business in 2016 found that seventyfour percent of Americans believe that CEOs are being paid more than they
should in relation to their average employee’s salary. 7 Leading up to the 2016
1. Philip Bump, The CEO of Your Company has Probably Already Earned Your 2016 Salary
this Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016
/01/05/the-ceo-of-your-company-has-probably-already-earned-your-2016-salary-this-year/?utm_
term=.572114b35d1b [https://perma.cc/7H58-UE7Y].
2. Id.
3. Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Pay Remains High Relative to the Pay of
Typical Workers and High-Wage Earners, ECON. POLICY INST. (July 20, 2017), http://www.epi.org
/publication/ceo-pay-remains-high-relative-to-the-pay-of-typical-workers-and-high-wage-earners/
[https://perma.cc/5VMF-3UC2].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Anders Melin, Executive Pay, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2018, 11:12 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/executive-pay [https://perma.cc/R9UG-GRNT].
7. DAVID F. LARCKER, NICHOLAS DONATIELLO & BRIAN TAYAN, STANFORD GRADUATE
SCH. OF BUS., AMERICANS AND CEO PAY: 2016 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY ON CEO
COMPENSATION 3 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-sur
vey-2016-americans-ceo-pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSY7-Q3HC].
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Presidential election, candidates from both sides of the aisle addressed the issue,
and then-candidate Donald Trump called the current executive compensation
environment “a total and complete joke.” 8 However, the massive inequality
between executive pay and typical employee pay has not always been an element
of the American business landscape. In the thirty years between 1985 and 2015,
the CEO-to-typical employee pay ratio increased from 46-to-1 to 276-to-1. 9
American lawmakers have explored numerous avenues attempting to curb this
executive compensation issue. The latest iteration comes in the form of a
mandatory disclosure required by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) and Item 402 of
Regulation S-K. 10 Under the “SEC Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule,” which came into
effect for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires public companies to disclose the ratio
of the compensation of their CEOs to the median compensation of their
employees in their yearly proxy statement. 11
Due to this Rule’s likely inefficacy and the unreasonable burden it will put
on reporting companies caused by inexactitude and a lack of direction from the
SEC, the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule will likely cause more harm than good. 12 If
the American government truly wants to rein in executive compensation, it
should look to two separate sources for a blueprint to success: the German
government and American history books. A combination of executive and board
regulations inspired by the German government and employee-centric social
influences that had success in America’s past could curb executive
compensation and allow for both employees and shareholders to offer their input
in more efficient and effective fashions.
Part I of this article will address the historical context behind executive
compensation in the United States and why it has become such a topic for
concern. In addition, Part I will discuss how American society has approached
the issue of executive compensation, both in the courts and in boardrooms. Part
II will discuss the three avenues American government has previously taken to
8. Jacob Goldstein, Why Did America’s CEOs Get Such a Big Raise?, NPR PLANET MONEY
(Feb. 18, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/18/467253394/why-did-americas-ceos-get
-such-a-big-raise [https://perma.cc/L829-RXY5].
9. Roger Lowenstein, CEO Pay Is Out of Control. Here’s How to Rein It In, FORTUNE (Apr.
19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/19/executive-compensation-ceo-pay/ [https://perma.cc/9PH
6-25FW].
10. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [https://perma.cc/TDB3-Z
UB7].
11. Id.
12. IKE BRANNON, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF
THE SEC’S PAY-RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION 2 (2014), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W446BH2].
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address executive compensation: taxation, “say-on-pay” proposals, and
mandatory disclosure requirements. Part III of this article will discuss the
government’s latest attempt at curbing executive compensation: the SEC Pay
Ratio Disclosure Rule. This section will discuss the requirements of the rule
itself, the public reaction to the rule, the application of the rule, and its likely
results. Part IV of this article will discuss how the German government has
handled the issue of executive compensation and will suggest that the American
government, drawing inspiration from its German counterpart, implement
employee representation on compensation committees through non-binding
recommendations.
II. A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE (OVER)COMPENSATION
A historical overview of executive compensation begins with the rise of the
position to be compensated: the executive. In general, the position of
“executive” exists simply as a medium through which passive ownershareholders manage large corporations. 13 Until the turn of the twentieth
century, executives did not exist, for the most part, because there was no need
for them. 14 Organizations were run by individuals who received their
compensation mostly from direct ownership. 15 The rise of salaried middle
managers began with railroads, which were too expansive and complex as
companies to be run by individuals. 16 Then, the “Great Merger Movement” of
the early twentieth century led to dispersed ownership as smaller companies
came together to form industrial conglomerates. 17 As companies grew in size,
majority owners handed off their senior management positions to non-owner
executives tasked with running the company in a way that would satisfy
shareholders. 18
During the era leading up to World War I, executives were compensated no
differently than other employees. 19 The predecessor to executive compensation
came in the form of executive bonus plans, and one of the first executive bonus
plans arose at Bethlehem Steel, headed at the time by Charles Schwab. 20 Under
that bonus plan, executives were paid a share of the company’s net profits, and
these bonuses grew nearly to the level of shareholder dividends by the late
1920s. 21 Executive bonus plans became increasingly popular as a method to
13. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight Over Executive
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2010).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 696.
18. Wells, supra note 13, at 696.
19. Id. at 697.
20. Id. at 699.
21. Id.
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align executive incentives with those of the shareholders. 22 Owners reaped the
benefits of increased shareholder value and, consequently, rewarded executives
with bonuses to incentivize the growth of company profits. 23
The first widely-heard objections to executive compensation policies
coincided with the fall of the American economy during the Great Depression.
With the economy failing, the American public became fixated on the idea that
corporations awarding executive compensation exceeding $1,000,000, like the
salaries brought home by the top executives at Bethlehem Steel, American
Tobacco, and National City Bank at the end of the 1920s, should have been
contributing some of that compensation to lower employees in hopes of
stimulating the economy. 24 However, public outrage against executive
compensation was not merely a coincidental byproduct of a failing economy.
The public may have spoken out about these executive salaries before the fall of
their economy, but they did not understand to what extent executives were being
compensated. In fact, the amounts paid to executives as compensation were, for
the most part, unknown to those in the public sphere until they were released to
the public as a result of lawsuits that were often unrelated to compensation. 25
Although public disclosure of executive salaries is commonplace today, the
first compelled compensation disclosures did not come until the 1930s. 26 New
Deal-era politicians, with the help of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
implemented the country’s first pay disclosure requirements, 27 the first of which
required railroads to identify those executives whose compensation exceeded
$10,000 a year. 28 In 1934, the SEC was created pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 29 Later that year, the SEC released rules requiring that
publicly owned companies release the compensation, including the various
components, of their top three executives. 30
While executive compensation continued to rise relative to inflation through
the 1930s, the 1940s brought a drop in executive compensation that has not been

22. Id. at 701.
23. Wells, supra note 13, at 701.
24. Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins & Harwell Wells, Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42
J. CORP. L. 59, 64 (2016).
25. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF FIN. 44 (George Constantinides et al. eds., Elsevier/North-Holland,
2013).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.; Railroad Salary Report: I.C.C. Asks Class 1 Roads About Jobs Paying More Than
$10,000 a Year, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1932, at 2.
29. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9KF-BXEW] (last visited Nov. 12,
2018).
30. Murphy, supra note 25, at 45.
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seen in the years since. 31 With World War II tightening labor markets and
increasing both union strength and government market intervention, the wartime
atmosphere was only one of a number of factors that contributed to the drop in
executive pay. 32 A 2011 study by Carola Frydman and Raven Molloy
determined that the drop in relative executive pay, defined as “the ratio of
executive pay to average industry earnings,” is largely related to a drop in the
return to firm size and a growing negative correlation between compensation
and industry unionization. 33
The war overseas during that period was the center of attention, and firms
on the home-front struggled because of it. Executive pay rose much less than
that of the typical worker during the 1940s, and the return to firm size fell from
1940 until 1942 and remained persistently low until 1949.34 Frydman and
Molloy attribute this correlative drop to a change in corporate governance
practices and shifting social norms. 35 During the war, the idea of the “equality
of sacrifice” rang throughout the media as people in America gave up their
wealth for the success of their soldiers fighting in foreign lands. 36 ThenPresident Roosevelt’s fireside chats repeated ideals of sacrificing for the good
of others most likely filtered into the business world, and these ideals may have
altered public perceptions of fairness regarding executives’ egregious paychecks
and the possibility of monopolizing firms taking advantage of the American
public. 37
Wartime also meant that unions on the home-front had an opportunity to
grow in power. With the war-time economy boosting many unionized industries,
employers were less opposed to union activity. 38 Additionally, the government
took action during wartime to minimize labor disputes so that the country could
focus on producing materiel for the fight overseas. 39 Union membership grew
drastically during the war and continued to stay high until the end of the
decade. 40 With greater support, unions were able to voice their opposition to

31. Carola Frydman & Raven Molloy, Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the
1940s 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17303, 2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. Id. at 24–25.
35. Id.
36. David M. Kennedy, The Nation: On the Home Front; What Is Patriotism Without
Sacrifice?, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/weekinreview/thenation-on-the-home-front-what-is-patriotism-without-sacrifice.html [https://perma.cc/43BK-NN
PT].
37. Frydman & Molloy, supra note 31, at 25.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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excessive executive salaries more effectively, and executives had no choice but
to listen or run the risk of losing their workforce. 41
After the drop in executive pay in the 1940s, executive compensation
stagnated relative to the average worker’s salary from the 1950s and into the late
1970s. 42 This is most likely due to the fact that top Federal Income Tax rates
during that period remained above seventy percent, temporarily deterring
executives from taking higher salaries. 43 From 1950 to 1975, average executive
compensation grew by only 0.8% annually after adjusting for inflation. 44 Due to
the phenomenon now referred to as the “Great Compression,” the increase in
post-WWII demand for less-educated workers combined with the consistently
rising minimum wage to create a smaller wage gap among employees. 45 With
more employees to pay, and a higher minimum wage to pay those employees,
executives had no choice but to distribute compensation out of a smaller pot than
they had become accustomed to in the 1920s. 46 As taxes rose for executives and
other top earners during the 1950s, companies transitioned to paying their
executives using tax-favored deferred compensation schemes. 47 The Revenue
Act of 1950 allowed companies to grant executives “restricted stock options”
which, in effect, gave executives an ascension to wealth in the form of ownership
of the company while not being subject to the risk of typical stocks. 48 The
“restricted stock options” of the Revenue Act of 1950 became “qualified stock
options” in the Revenue Act of 1964. 49 “Qualified stock options” gave
executives the benefit of holding stock in their company while receiving much
more favorable tax treatment than typical stocks. 50 However, this transition to
deferred compensation options did not have a substantial effect on overall
executive compensation into the 1970s. 51
The squeeze on executive pay lasted almost thirty years, but tides turned in
the latter half of the 1970s. From 1973 to 1979, median cash compensation for
CEOs in the Forbes 800 rose more than 12.2% annually while the annual
inflation rate was 8.5%. 52 For the first time since before WWII, executive pay
41. Id.
42. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 93 n.261.
43. History of Federal Income Tax Rates: 1913 – 2017, BRADFORD TAX INSTITUTE,
https://bradfordtaxinstitute.com/Free_Resources/Federal-Income-Tax-Rates.aspx [https://perma.
cc/ZTJ3-UXJU] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
44. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 65.
45. Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the
United State at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1, 32 (1992)
46. Id.
47. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 78.
48. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 218, 64 Stat. 906, 942 (1950).
49. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 221, 78 Stat. 19, 64–66 (1964).
50. Id.
51. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 65–66.
52. Id. at 66.
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had experienced a sustained growth relative to the inflation rate, and it was only
getting started. 53 According to an article in Newsweek from 1991, “CEO pay
rose dramatically all through the 1980s—212 percent . . . —four times faster
than pay for ordinary workers.” 54
Executive compensation continued to climb at an astronomical rate through
the 1990s. The median compensation of an S&P 500 CEO was $2.2 million in
1992. 55 By 2001, that number had grown to $7.2 million, more than a 200%
increase. 56 The early twenty-first century was the pinnacle for American
executive compensation, and executive compensation has been declining slowly
ever since. 57 However, CEO compensation is still extremely high in relation to
the average employee’s salary, and the American public is asking: How did this
happen? What does it mean? And how will it change?
Outrage against excessive executive compensation became a major societal
concern in the 1980s when a takeover boom arose fueled by the junk bond
market, which facilitated the financing of large takeovers. 58 As executives in the
country’s biggest companies feared losing their positions of power due to hostile
takeovers from shareholders, many large firms implemented so-called “golden
parachutes” to provide ousted executives with cash payouts and other benefits
to ease their transition into unemployment. 59 While an abundance of takeovers
in the 1980s cost mid-level workers their jobs and their livelihoods, executives
received notice of their dismissal alongside lucrative severance payments. 60
Naturally, the vast majority of Americans who did not receive millions of dollars
upon their termination were furious with the executives who did. It did not help
that American executives in the early 1990s were making roughly three times
their counterparts in Britain, four times their counterparts in Germany, and six
times their counterparts in Japan. 61 This discrepancy is likely related to the shift
toward performance-oriented pay for American executives in the early 1990s. 62
The issue with the rise of performance-oriented pay is that the correlation
between the performance of a company and the executives’ pay has never been
53. Id.
54. The Pay Police, NEWSWEEK (June 16, 1991, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/paypolice-204464 [https://perma.cc/AV7Y-HYEB].
55. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67.
56. Id.
57. Mishel & Schieder, supra note 3.
58. Peer Fiss, A Short History of Golden Parachutes, HARV. BUS. REV., (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/a-short-history-of-golden-parachutes [https://perma.cc/6VUG-NVVA].
59. Id.
60. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67.
61. Peter Passell, Economic Watch; Those Big Executive Salaries May Mask a Bigger
Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/20/business/economicwatch-those-big-executive-salaries-may-mask-a-bigger-problem.html?pagewanted=all [https://per
ma.cc/J5P2-QKSP].
62. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67–68.
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clear. 63 Graef Crystal, a professor from the University of California at Berkeley
and an expert on executive pay, conducted a survey in the early 1990s that found
that ninety-six percent of CEO pay “has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with
the company’s performance.” 64 Crystal compared the executive compensation
at 450 corporations to the total return received by those corporations’
shareholders and found that only five percent of the statistical variation could be
explained by the company’s performance that year. 65 Crystal concluded that,
“[t]he most common reference used by compensation committees must be a
table of random numbers.” 66
Boards of directors typically determined executive pay leading up to the
1990s, but a trend arose that decade where CEOs recruited directors who might
have been more likely to reward greater executive compensation in return for
their position as director. 67 Crystal’s study uncovered an interesting observation
in the 1990s: “the higher the directors’ fees, the higher the CEO’s pay.” 68 This
suggests that CEOs were buying directors’ loyalty with high directors’ fees and
accepting the directors’ thanks in the form of higher compensation. 69
Another issue that arose from performance-oriented pay is the “ratchet
effect” (also called the “Lake Wobegon” effect after the fictional lake in a
Garrison Keillor novel where “all the children are above average”). 70 As boards
of directors meet to set their executives’ compensations, they typically bring in
an outside consultant to determine an appropriate amount. 71 Those consultants
usually compare peer companies and provide the boards with what would equate
to an average executive compensation. 72 However, afraid to admit that their
executives are simply “average,” the board of directors will set their executives’
compensation at a level that would equate to the sixtieth or seventieth percentile,
“ratcheting up” the average executive compensation with each “above-average”
determination. 73
The rapid growth of executive compensation came to a halt in the early
2000s due to the “dot-com” bubble burst and corporate governance scandals
such as what lead to the collapse of Enron. 74 As the economy sank and the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See The Pay Police, supra note 54.
See id. See also Passell, supra note 61.
See Passell, supra note 61.
Id.
See The Pay Police, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
DANIEL JUROW ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: HOW DOES PAY INFLUENCE
DECISIONS AND GOVERNANCE? 7, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/leadership/sites/leadership/
files/bernstein-exec-comp-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WFQ-84EN].
71. The Pay Police, supra note 52.
72. Id.
73. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 7.
74. Bank, Cheffins & Wells , supra note 24, at 68.
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American people had tangible evidence of executives extorting their power,
executives lost bargaining power and were forced to give up some of their
questionably-earned pay. 75 The financial crisis in 2008 led to another slight drop
in executive pay, but executive pay in America still vastly eclipses the pay of
the average employee. 76
The ratio of executive pay to average employee pay in America has practical
implications beyond public perception and international comparison. Studies
have shown that there is a significant relationship between pay equity among
different levels of employees and the resulting product quality. 77 It is the
author’s opinion that product quality can be a crucial determinant of customer
satisfaction and business profitability. The perception of unfairness created by
vast pay inequity, as is becoming prominent in America today, can lead to a
decreasing sense of worth from lower-level employees and, ultimately, lost
profits. 78
III. THREE REGULATORY APPROACHES TO CURBING EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Instead of sitting back while executives continually drive their
compensation higher than the levels enjoyed by their employees, American
regulators have attempted to curb excessive executive compensation in three
different fashions: tax implementation, shareholder-powered “say on pay”
proposals, and compelled disclosure. 79
A.

Taxation of Executive Compensation

In August of 1993, on the recommendation of then-President Bill Clinton,
Congress enacted legislation—the Revenue Recollection Act of 1993 and
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code—that removed the ability of
corporations to deduct executive compensation in excess of one million dollars
that was not performance-based. 80 In addition, the Revenue Recollection Act
imposed a special surtax on incomes exceeding $250,000.00 per year. 81 The
Congressional theory was that exorbitant executive salaries would be too costly
from a tax standpoint to negotiate and to provide. 82 Writing shortly after the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Douglas M. Cowherd & David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity Between LowerLevel Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory, 37 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 302, 314, 316 (1992).
78. Id. at 307.
79. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8–9.
80. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation – A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 937, 940 (1993).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 957.
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release of the Revenue Recollection Act, Charles M. Elson of Stetson University
said that, “[t]his response is akin to removing a splinter by amputating the limb.
The splinter is gone, but at an enormous cost.” 83 He theorized then that the
attempt to place a cap on executive compensation would limit the productivity
of executives who were incentivized by higher salaries. 84 When he opined that
the “tax-based ‘cure’ may result in more harm to the patient than the initial
problem,” he was correct that it would result in more harm, but the cause of the
harm was not what he expected. 85
The initial response to the $1,000,000 cap was to inspire companies whose
CEOs earned less than that amount to increase their executive salaries. 86 Instead
of becoming a mark that companies should avoid, the million dollar mark
became a “standard” for executive salary and a bargaining point for those CEOs
who thought they were not being compensated enough. 87 In the first year after
the tax was imposed, executive pay increased at a rate twenty-nine percent faster
than it had in the fourteen years before the tax came into effect. 88 Section 162(m)
made it much more difficult for shareholders to challenge the reasonableness of
any executive salary under one million dollars, and, while one million dollars
might be pocket change for some executives in large corporations, it could be
entirely unreasonable for executives with smaller roles in smaller
organizations. 89
In light of the shareholders’ inability to challenge salaries under one million
dollars, it must be mentioned that courts have a history of being particularly
hesitant to interfere in executive compensation practices when shareholders
attempt to challenge compensation through derivative actions. 90 Because
executive compensation decisions are protected by the business judgment rule,
the court applies an assumption that the board of directors made the correct
decision in allocating assets so long as there is no self-dealing and so long as
there is not a waste of corporate assets. 91 The doctrine of waste, established by
the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Hill, indicates that companies cannot “justify
payments of sums as salaries so large as in substance and effect to amount to
spoliation or waste of corporate property.” 92 However, applying the doctrine of

83. Id. at 958.
84. Id.
85. Elson, supra note 80, at 958.
86. Joy S. Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through
the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 522–23 (2009).
87. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8.
88. Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 89 (1998).
89. Id. at 96–97.
90. Elson, supra note 80, at 959–60.
91. Id.
92. 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
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waste has been notoriously difficult to accomplish as explained by the Heller v.
Boylan case from the New York State Supreme Court:
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what yardstick is
to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuringrod? The conscience of
equity? Equity is but another name for human being temporarily judicially
robed. He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold
that it knows more about managing this corporation than its stockholders? 93

In the infamous Walt Disney case where Michael Ovitz received $140 million
dollars in a severance package after only fourteen months of employment, the
court reiterated the difficult burden of proving waste by saying “waste is a rare,
unconscionable case[] where directors irrationally squander or give away
corporate assets.” 94
In addition to mystifying the amount of executive compensation that would
qualify as reasonable, Section 162(m) also allowed for unlimited deductions on
executive compensation over one million dollars attributed to performancebased pay. 95 Treasury regulations provide an exceedingly low bar for
performance based pay: “[a] performance goal need not, however, be based upon
an increase or positive result under a business criterion and could include, for
example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic losses.” 96
Section 162(m) was not the only failed attempt at curbing executive
compensation through taxation. Sections 280G and 4999, signed before Section
162(m), similarly missed their mark. 97 Section 280G, intended to decrease
implementation of golden parachutes, disallowed tax deductions for golden
parachute payments exceeding the amount 2.99 times greater than annual
compensation. 98 However, like the cap on executive compensation, this led to
the standardized golden parachute payment being at least 2.99 times annual
compensation. 99 Section 4999 imposed a tax equal to twenty percent the amount
of any payment in excess of the golden parachute limit set in Section 280G. 100
Companies responded with “gross ups,” or increases in payment, to cover the
twenty percent tax imposed on their golden parachute agreements. 101 This
resulted in corporate monies being used to both inflate executive compensation
and to pay off the taxes resulting from the inflated compensation.

93. 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
94. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (alteration
in original).
95. Mullane, supra note 86, at 524.
96. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) (2018).
97. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8.
98. 26 U.S.C. § 280G (2000).
99. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8.
100. 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (2000).
101. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8.
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Shareholder “Say-on-Pay” Proposals

Shareholders had voiced their opinions about executive compensation for
many years before they were given the authority to weigh in and the means to
do so. 102 The origin of the “say-on-pay” proposal, as it is now known, is an
expansion to SEC Rule 14a-8 in 1992 to include executive compensation among
the issues shareholder proxy proposals were able to address. 103 Previously
disallowed under the “ordinary business” exclusion preventing shareholders
from submitting proposals having to do with the ordinary business of a
company’s management, 104 political unrest with the issue of executive
compensation in the early 1990s inspired the SEC to place a renewed emphasis
on that issue. 105
Starting in 1992, shareholders had the power to offer their opinion on the
paychecks executives were cashing. However, “say-on-pay” votes in the United
States are merely advisory: even if the shareholders responded to a proposal with
a resounding “yes” or “no” vote, the company has the ability to completely
ignore the proposal. 106 Additionally, “say-on-pay” proposals were not initially
required until the United States mandated their inclusion under the Dodd-Frank
Act. 107 The current iteration of Rule 14A requires that companies submit a “sayon-pay” proposal to their shareholders in the annual proxy at least once every
three years. 108 Even so, the “say-on-pay” proposal is merely an advisory vote,
as the vote “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an
issuer.” 109
So far, the advisory “say-on-pay” proposals have produced mixed results in
the United States. A 2017 study in the Multinational Finance Journal cited
studies that have found that “shareholders generally support managers’ pay
packages unless the firm performs poorly and has excessive executive pay, low
shareholder returns, and negative proxy voting recommendations.” 110 Another
study cited found that “fewer than 3% of firms fail to pass their say-on-pay
proposals, but shareholder dissent is higher in firms with high CEO

102. Stephani A. Mason, Ann F. Medinets & Dan Palmon, Say-on-Pay: Is Anybody Listening?,
20 MULTINAT’L FIN. J. 273, 285 (2016).
103. Id. at 285–86.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1963).
105. Mason, Medinets & Palmon, supra note 102, at 285.
106. Id. at 286.
107. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and
Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, (Jan. 25, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [https://perma.cc/EA84-TRTT].
108. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation,
76 Fed. Reg. 6010–11 (Jan. 25, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c) (2012).
110. Mason, Medinets & Palmon, supra note 102, at 292.
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compensation or poor performance.” 111 In other words, advisory “say-on-pay”
proposals are extremely unlikely to pass, even when shareholders are upset with
executive compensation or the company’s performance.
The argument for the ineffectiveness of advisory “say-on-pay” votes is twofold: shareholders do not want to put in the effort necessary to make a
meaningful vote, and shareholders have a more powerful ability than advisory
voting. 112 For those shareholders with minimal holdings in the company, “the
opportunity cost to become informed is high” due to the elaborate nature of
compensation plans. 113 Shareholders with more expansive, non-controlling
holdings are unlikely to vote against executive compensation because there is a
high chance their own executive compensation is arguably excessive as well. 114
The shareholders’ greater power, however, is the power to sell their shares. 115 If
shareholders are not happy with a company’s executive compensation plans,
they can sell their shares and move on to a different investment. Those with
short-term investments have little to no incentive to vote, and those with longterm investments are shown to be very likely to vote in favor of the company’s
compensation plan. 116
C. Disclosure of Executive Compensation
The “say-on-pay” initiative was not the only effort the SEC took in the early
1990s to curb executive compensation. Coinciding with the expansion of
shareholder proposals to include executive compensation, the SEC increased
requirements for the disclosure of executive compensation. 117 As already
mentioned, compensation disclosure became mandatory in the 1930s. 118 The
goal then was to “shame” executives into taking smaller compensation packages
following the Great Depression. 119 In 1938, the disclosure requirement
expanded to include full descriptions of compensation plans, and in 1942 those
compensation arrangements were required to be presented in tables for each
director or officer making more than $20,000 a year. 120 Ten years later, the SEC
mandated disclosure for each director and for the “top 3” executives, as well as
demanding that deferred compensation, in the forms of pension or retirement
plans, had to be disclosed separately. 121

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Mason, Medinets & Palmon, supra note 102, at 308.
Id.
Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 92.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
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In 1978, the SEC again increased disclosure requirements by mandating that
companies make their compensation disclosures closer to the beginning of
disclosure documents, attempting to prevent those disclosures from being buried
within the documentation. 122 As addressed previously, the heightened scrutiny
on disclosures in the early 1990s coincided with an incredible boom in executive
compensation. 123 Reflecting on the reform of the 1990s, Graef Crystal, who had
been an advisor to the SEC for the purposes of developing the reform, said, “I
absolutely thought it would cause comp[ensation] to go down because the
disclosures would be so embarrassing. But it turned out that when somebody is
hauling in $200 million, he’s not embarrassable.” 124
While the goal of increased disclosure was to shame executives into taking
lower salaries, more than seventy years of disclosure has only led to increased
salaries. A 2006 New York Times article summarizes the various attempts to curb
executive compensation and how they have failed. 125 The article points out that
increased disclosure has only lead to an increased awareness of what other
executives are making and how they are making it. 126 The author states: “history
suggests that whenever [an executive] discover[s] a fellow C.E.O. is getting
something they don’t have, they make a grab for it.” 127
In the same article, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said that “[i]t is
not the role of the S.E.C. to determine the level of compensation. It is the role of
directors and shareholders.” 128 This would seem to be backwards as the SEC
continues to enact stricter regulations on compensation disclosure, while
directors only have incentives to increase compensation and shareholder “sayon-pay” proposals lack the necessary power or participation to have a legitimate
effect.
The current state of executive compensation has scholars perplexed. At the
end of the 2006 article, author Joseph Nocera left this note:
So how would you fix the executive pay problem? Send me your ideas at
tsnocera@nytimes.com. If I get enough good ones, I’ll revisit the subject. And
if not, I’ll just keep wringing my hands, like everyone else.

Nocera left the Times in 2015. 129 He never released a solution to the issue of
executive compensation.
122. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 91.
123. Id. at 92.
124. Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won’t Tame C.E.O. Pay, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/14/business/disclosure-wont-tame-ceo-pay.html
[https://perma.cc/LVF9-SMUY].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Joe Nocera, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/by/joe-nocera [https://perma.cc/MX
6Y-LGJ4].
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IV. THE SEC PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE: MORE TROUBLE THAN
IT’S WORTH
The latest regulatory attempt at curbing executive compensation is Section
953(b) of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which is more casually referred to as the “pay ratio directive” or the “SEC Pay
Ratio Disclosure Rule” (the “Rule”). 130 Originally proposed in 2010, the final
Rule passed in August of 2015. 131 Author of the Rule, U.S. Senator Bob
Menendez of New Jersey, celebrated the passage of the rule in saying that the
Rule would “[restore] sanity to runaway executive pay.” 132 Menendez insisted
that “[t]his simple benchmark will help investors monitor both how a company
treats [its] average workers and whether its executive pay is reasonable.” 133
The Rule was set to take effect in 2017, with initial disclosures coming in
proxy statements during 2018. 134 This buffer period turned out to be
advantageous as the Rule produced continuous debate lasting up until those
affected were forced to turn their attention to implementing the rule. 135
Initial supporters of the Rule, like N.Y. State Comptroller Thomas P.
DiNapoli, opined that a great disparity between CEO pay and employee pay
would lead to a drop in morale and productivity. 136 Laura Campos, the Director
of Shareholder Activities for the Nathan Cummings Foundation, wrote a letter
to the Secretary of the SEC, Elizabeth Murphy, illustrating that shareholders
have a right to know information concerning executive pay because those
exorbitant wages could be used to improve the company and the corresponding
stock. 137 Even Hillary Clinton spoke out in support of the Rule, saying that
“workers have a right to know whether executive pay at their company has
gotten out of balance, and so does the public.” 138

130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
953(b) (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
131. Press Release, Menendez Reacts to SEC Vote Approving CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio Rule,
U.S. SENATOR BOB MENENDEZ (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-andevents/press/menendez-reacts-to-sec-vote-approving-ceo-to-worker-pay-ratio-rule [https://perma.
cc/D87X-5NHZ].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 10.
135. See Press Release, Acting Chairman Michael S. Piwowar, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
Reconsideration of Pay Ratio Rule Implementation, (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
statement/reconsideration-of-pay-ratio-rule-implementation.html
[https://perma.cc/NBF8-NM
LB].
136. Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, N.Y. State Comptroller, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 27, 2013).
137. Letter from Laura Campos, Director of Shareholder Activities, The Nathan Cummings
Foundation, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 21, 2013).
138. Drew Harwell & Jena McGregor, This New Rule Could Reveal the Huge Gap Between
CEO Pay and Worker Pay, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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The Rule’s initial passage came as a result of a 3-2 vote from the SEC. 139
The two dissenting Commissioners, Daniel Gallagher and Michael Piwowar,
responded to the passage with seething dissents. 140 In response to the SEC’s
reasoning that the Rule would “help inform investors in their oversight of
executive compensation, including say-on-pay votes,” Gallagher, stealing a line
from Justice Scalia, said, “this is pure applesauce.” 141 Gallagher argued that the
Rule was far too broad, particularly the definition of “employee”, and that
implementation would cost an “astronomical” amount of money. 142 He found
“no credible evidence in the record that a reasonable investor would find the pay
ratio to be useful,” and called the pay ratio information that would be disclosed
“low-quality, non-comparable data of use only to certain investors who have
idiosyncratic reasons for wanting it.” 143 From Gallagher’s point of view, the
intent of the Rule was to “name and shame registrants into reducing CEO
pay.” 144 He closed out his comments by saying that the Rule “highlights the sad
fact that, over five years after Dodd-Frank, the Commission is still wandering
through the wilderness, and that the voice of one or two minority Commissioners
crying out in that wilderness can do little to put us back on the right path.” 145
Piwowar had different concerns, stating that the Rule “pandered to
politically-connected special interest groups and, independent of the [DoddFrank] Act, could not stand on its own merits.” 146 He stated that the Dodd-Frank
Act allows for investor testing of possible regulations, but the SEC did not take
advantage of this testing in development of the Rule. 147 He also pointed out that
the passage of the Rule was rushed, and the timing of the vote was intentional
due to rising opposition in Congress and the convenient recesses in the House of
Representatives and the Senate, allowing for passage with reduced

on-leadership/wp/2015/08/04/this-new-rule-could-reveal-the-huge-gap-between-ceo-pay-andworker-pay/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4202b4158c49 [https://perma.cc/5SVT-CKJS].
139. Peter Schroeder, SEC Finalizes Contentious CEO Pay Ratio Rule, THE HILL (Aug. 5,
2015, 12:37 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/250317-sec-finalizes-contentious-ceo-payratio-rules [https://perma.cc/2ZHJ-L3WK].
140. Id.
141. Daniel M. Gallagher, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting to Adopt the “Pay Ratio”
Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting
-statement-at-open-meeting-to-adopt-the-pay-ratio-rule.html#_ednref4 [https://perma.cc/L4N7-J4
5U].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Michael S. Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-state
ment-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/46TM-83HV].
147. Id.
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opposition. 148 In Piwowar’s words, the SEC’s actions qualified as “bullying
tactics,” and according to Piwowar, “[a]cquiescing to bullies only gives them
more ammunition and makes it worse.” 149
Continued opposition threatened the enactment of the Rule. As recently as
February of 2017, then-Acting Chairman of the SEC Piwowar opened the Rule
up to comment. 150 Not until September of 2017, three months before the Rule
were to go into effect, did the SEC confirm that the Rule would be
implemented. 151 At that point, some public companies required to disclose a
ratio had yet to begin preparing for its calculation, leaving them with an
extremely short amount of time to achieve compliance. 152
The major points of opposition are that the Rule is excessively costly and
provides no real benefit to investors. 153 The excessive costs come from the time
and manpower needed to calculate the required ratio. 154 The Center for Capital
Markets conducted a study comprised of 118 public companies that would be
required to disclose their pay ratio and found that the average company expected
to spend 952 hours per year calculating their ratio at an average labor cost of
$185,600. 155 Applied to the entire population of public companies that are
affected by the Rule, this equates to $710.9 million and 3.6 million hours applied
to compliance with the Rule annually. 156
The difficulty in complying with the Rule is a product of the language of the
Rule itself. 157 The statute provides that an “employee” means “an individual
employed by the registrant or any of its consolidated subsidiaries, whether as a
full-time, part-time, seasonal, or temporary worker, as of a date chosen by the
registrant within the last three months of the registrant’s last completed fiscal
year.” 158 The proposed rule stated that public companies should determine their
median employee from an employee base established on the last day of their
fiscal year, but outside comments from public companies whose employee bases
are heavily affected by seasonal hiring requested a more lenient standard. 159
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Piwowar, supra note 135.
151. Kelly Simoneaux & Hope Spencer, CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure – Time to Prepare, NAT’L
LAW REVIEW (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ceo-pay-ratio-disclosuretime-to-prepare [https://perma.cc/NE3K-KK3L].
152. Id.
153. See Gallagher, supra note 141; Piwowar, supra note 146.
154. Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 14, 21–22 (2016).
155. BRANNON, supra note 12, at 6–7.
156. Id. at 7.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2017).
158. Id.
159. Recent Regulation, Securities Regulation – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act — SEC Finalizes Regulations Requiring Companies to Disclose Pay
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While this may be helpful for public companies with seasonal employee
populations that do not accurately represent the average employee population, it
provides additional compliance costs for public companies who either (1) have
tax and payroll systems that are not calculated until the last day of the fiscal year,
or (2) go through the added work of calculating ratios determined by employee
populations on numerous dates for the most favorable numbers. 160
In additional guidance for applying the Rule, the SEC excluded from the
definition of employee “workers who are employed, and whose compensation is
determined, by an unaffiliated third party but who provide services to the
registrant or its consolidated subsidiaries as independent contractors or ‘leased’
workers.” 161 However, many public companies hire employees under the
“independent contractor” title and determine those employees’ compensation,
which produces even more effort required for companies who employ both
independent contractors whose compensation is determined by a third party,
such as a contracting firm, and independent contractors on contracts with
compensation determined by the company itself. 162 The law requires that the
public company affected by the Rule “may identify the median employee using
annual total compensation or any other compensation measure that is
consistently applied to all employees included in the calculation.” 163
Additionally, public companies are allowed to exclude certain employees from
this calculation. 164 Up to five percent of non-U.S. employees are excludable, but
the public company must exclude all the employees from any non-U.S. country
if they choose to exclude any employee from that country. 165 Also, employees
from countries where data privacy laws may conflict with the disclosure are also
excludable. 166 Both of these exclusions may help public companies with large,
multi-national employee populations, but executing the exclusions still requires
an impressive amount of work to determine if the exclusions will save time or
produce a more favorable ratio. 167
By way of offering guidance for how to determine the components of
“annual total compensation” necessitated by the Rule, the regulation provides
Ratio Between the CEO and Median Employee. — Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50, 104,
(Aug. 18, 2015) (To be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 229, 240, 249), 129 HARV. L. REV. 1144, 1147
(2016) (hereinafter Recent Regulation).
160. Id. at 1151.
161. Cydney S. Posner, SEC (Limited) Guidance on Pay-Ratio Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Oct. 1, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/10/01/sec-limited-guidance-on-pay-ratio-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/T5WWUXTN].
162. Id.
163. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(ii)(B).
164. Recent Regulation, supra note 159, at 1146.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
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this definition: “Annual total compensation means total compensation for the
registrant’s last completed fiscal year.” 168 The SEC allows the use of “reasonable
estimates” in calculating annual total compensation, 169 but it offers no guidance
regarding how benefits, allowances, insurance costs, et cetera should be included
in the calculation. 170
The flexibility allowed in determining the ratio required by the Rule “will
likely render pay ratio comparability across companies—even those within the
same industry—virtually unachievable.” 171 Because each public company can
determine compensation in its own manner and choose to exclude certain
employees at their discretion, there is extensive potential for public companies
to game the disclosure in deceptive ways. 172 Each public company’s disclosure
will be unique, but it is inevitable that activists will use the ratios to “name and
shame” certain public companies with high pay ratios, 173 even if the differing
pay ratios produce “no particular insight whether a CEO or the median employee
is fairly compensated.” 174
As of January 2018, one pay ratio has been released from a reporting
company. 175 Invivo Therapeutics Holdings Corp., a public company of sixteen
employees, submitted this verbose disclosure in their proxy statement:
PAY RATIO
Following is a reasonable estimate, prepared under applicable SEC rules, of the
ratio of the annual total compensation of our Chief Executive Officer to the
median of the annual total compensation of our other employees. We determined
our median employee based on base salary (annualized in the case of full- and
part-time employees who joined the Company during 2017) of each of our 16
employees (excluding the Chief Executive Officer) as of December 1, 2017. Of
the two potential median employees, we selected the employee without
significant severance payments. The annual total compensation of our median
employee (other than the Chief Executive Officer) for 2017 was $384,528. As
disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table appearing on page 76, our
former Chief Executive Officer’s annual total compensation for 2017 was
$2,471,333. Our former Chief Executive Officer served in this capacity from

168. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(2)(ii).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
170. BRANNON, supra note 12, at 5–6.
171. Allan B. Afterman, Pay Ratio Disclosure: A Final SEC Rule Laden with Controversy,
CPA JOURNAL (Apr. 2016), https://www.cpajournal.com/2016/04/14/pay-ratio-disclosure-finalsec-rule-laden-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/LH3G-6KJD].
172. Bank & Georgiev, supra note 154, at 22.
173. Afterman, supra note 171.
174. BRANNON, supra note 12, at 4.
175. Cydney S. Posner, First Pay-Ratio Disclosure Sighted, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2dbb1d7-c68e-4a29-a1c7-58e5d84148e9
[https://perma.cc/M6K6-86C5].
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January 1, 2017 to December 18, 2017, which includes December 1, 2017, the
date of determination for the median employee. As noted in the footnotes of the
Summary Compensation Table, Mr. Perrin’s salary in the Summary
Compensation Table includes a payment of 10 days salary in conjunction with
his resignation in lieu of the notice period in his Employment Agreement, so his
annual total compensation includes salary for a full year. Based on the foregoing,
our estimate of the ratio of the annual total compensation of our CEO to the
median of the annual total compensation of all other employees was 6.4 to 1.
Given the different methodologies that various public companies will use to
determine an estimate of their pay ratio, the estimated ratio reported above
should not be used as a basis for comparison between companies. 176

Note that Invivo took the initiative to explicitly plead that the ratio disclosed
should not be used to compare public companies. Also, note the variety of
elements that went into determining the ratio in a public company with less than
twenty employees. Imagine the time and effort it would take to apply this Rule
in a public company of twenty thousand employees. Due to the flexibility of the
Rule and the arbitrary nature of the results, early findings show that the Rule
will cost a lot more than it is worth.
V. TAKING A TIP FROM GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
After the global economic downtown at the end of the twenty-first century’s
first decade, global leaders met in Pittsburgh for the G20 Summit. 177 Political
leaders from around the world agreed that extensive executive compensation
reform was needed to prevent future economic crises. 178 In the U.S., the first
attempt at comprehensive economic reform came in the form of the
aforementioned Dodd-Frank Act. 179 On the date of the Act’s passage, the New
York Times wrote that “a number of the details have been left for regulators to
work out, inevitably setting off complicated tangles down the road that could
last for years.” 180 The Times was correct in its prediction that implementing the
Act would be arduous. As of the five-year anniversary of the Act’s passage,
almost thirty percent of the rulemaking deadlines set in the Act had passed
without finalization of any rule. 181 A packet of all of the rules passed or proposed
by that anniversary would contain more pages than thirty-four copies of Herman
176. Invivo Therapeutics Holdings Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Jan. 26, 2018).
177. Emilie Mathieu, Beyond Wall Street: Germany, the United States, and Executive
Compensation, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2013).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 596.
180. Id.; Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html [https://perma.cc/9LEP-5L
SD].
181. DAVISPOLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (July 16, 2015), https://www.davispolk.
com/files/2015-07-16_Dodd-Frank_Progress_Report_Five-Year_Anniversary.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3V6G-U87S].
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Melville’s Moby Dick. 182 While U.S. regulators labored to implement economic
reform post-recession, the powers-that-were in Germany made quick work in
passing legislation that took almost as long to take effect as it does to pronounce.
In June of 2009, before the G20 Summit when global leaders were to discuss
executive
compensation
reform,
Germany
passed
the
Vorstandsvergiltungsangemessenheitsgesetz, or “VorstAG” for short. 183 While
the Dodd-Frank Act has taken years to be put into action, the VorstAG was
entirely entered into force by the end of that summer. 184 The VorstAG was
designed to reformat German executive compensation by increasing
transparency and giving shareholders more insight into companies’
compensation policies, both goals the Dodd-Frank Act intended to achieve. 185 It
is important to note that, while executive compensation had been a contentious
topic for decades in the U.S. by the time the 2009 G20 Summit came around,
excessive executive compensation had been a non-issue in Germany until the
turn of the century. 186 In 1997, the top German executives at Daimler-Chrysler,
BMW, VEBA, and Siemens in Germany made from $1.5 to $2.5 million, while
the top American executives at Daimler-Chrysler, GE, Intel, and Healthsouth
made between $14 and $131 million (using a rough conversion from the nowdefunct deutschmark). 187
There are two reasons German executive compensation was so low for so
long. First, the body that governs German public companies, the Aktiengesetz,
did not allow companies to offer stock options as compensation until 1998. 188
Second, the driving historical forces for German and American corporate
governance were very different. While the U.S. focused on “stock market” or
“Anglo-American capitalism” that inspired companies to run primarily for the
benefit of shareholders, German companies historically practiced “welfare
capitalism,” which places an emphasis on the concerns of the stakeholders,
including employees and creditors. 189 In a welfare capitalism system, a
company’s executive compensation is tied to the interests of the employees and
creditors of the company, and those interests lead to greater influence in setting
compensation. 190 Whereas American companies were more concerned with
growth, German companies, under the welfare capitalism system, were

182. DAVISPOLK, FIVE YEARS OF DODD-FRANK (2015), https://www.davispolk.com/files/
dodd-frank_five-year_anniversary_infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR2L-B7FW].
183. Mathieu, supra note 177, at 583.
184. Id. at 584–85.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 600.
187. Id. at 600 & n. 95.
188. Mathieu, supra note 177, at 600.
189. Trevor Buck & Azura Shahrim, The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes
Across National Cultures: The Case of Germany, 36 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 42, 43 (2005).
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concerned with the economic stability that comes with satisfied employees and
creditors. 191
At the turn of the century, Anglo-American capitalism found its way across
the pond and into German territory on the heels of the Daimler-Chrysler
merger. 192 When the two companies came together, the vice chairman of the U.S.
company made more than the top ten German employees combined. 193 With
stock options available as an element of executive compensation post-1998,
German executives began to follow the lead of their American counterparts and
focus on the shareholders instead of the stakeholders. 194 German compensation
rose over the opening decade of the twenty-first century, but it came nowhere
close to where American compensation stands. 195 AFL-CIO information
compiled in 2012 found that German CEOs were paid salaries 147 times as large
as their average workers, but top-ranking American executives at S&P 500
companies made 354 times as much as their average workers during that year. 196
The differences in how the U.S. and Germany treat executive compensation
are amplified by the corporate governance systems in place in both countries.
Due to German skepticism toward directors’ ability to protect a company’s
interests while making decisions affecting other stakeholders, German stock
companies are required to have a two-tiered board. 197 Such companies must
have a management board to run the company and a supervisory board to ensure
that the management board is doing their job. 198 Any member of the
management board cannot also serve on the supervisory board, establishing a
check on the powers of the management board and ensuring that the
management board is acting in the best interests of the company. 199

191. Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 501 (2001).
192. Mathieu, supra note 177, at 602–03; Edmund L. Andrews & Laura M. Holson, Shaping a
Global Giant: The Overview; Daimler-Benz Will Acquire Chrysler in $36 Billion Deal That Will
Reshape Industry, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/07/business/shap
ing-global-giant-overview-daimler-benz-will-acquire-chrysler-36-billion-deal.html [https://perma.
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1998),
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[https://perma.cc/U4SG-CJ45].
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HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/15/sp-500-ceos_n_
3085601.html [https://perma.cc/C8EF-RQRS].
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Additionally, the supervisory board determines the compensation of the
members of the management board. 200
In contrast, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations requires that the majority
of directors at listed issuing companies be disinterested, but interested directors
can serve on compensation committees or perform the function of determining
compensation (so long as they do not vote on their own salaries, which would
be challengeable by shareholders absent shareholder ratification). 201 Some
corporations might attempt to mimic the formation of a supervisory board in the
formation of compensation committees, but they are not required. 202 There are
some requirements for the independence of compensation committee members
among NYSE and NASDAQ-listed companies, 203 but the independence of these
committee members does not produce the same company-centric concern that
the German supervisory board does.
Part of the reason German supervisory boards are so concerned with the
well-being of the company is the presence of employee representation on
supervisory boards, a concept known as co-determination. 204 Under German
law, companies with more than 2,000 employees must allow employees working
in Germany to elect fifty percent of the supervisory board. 205 If there are
supplementary committees to take on tasks such as determining executive
compensation, they must follow the same ratio. 206 Those elected by the
employee population will be much more likely to avoid approving excessive
executive compensation for two reasons. First and foremost, those from the
average employee population will be blown away by the numbers presented in
multimillion dollar compensation packages. 207 A 2016 study from the Stanford
Graduate School of Business found that the typical American believes a CEO at
a Fortune 500 company earns $1.0 million in compensation. 208 The median
reported compensation for Fortune 500 CEOs in 2016 was $10.3 million, ten
times the estimate of the typical citizen. 209 The other reason employee
200. Aktiengesetz [AktG][Stock Corporation Act], § 112, translation at https://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_aktg/englisch_aktg.html#p0591 [https://perma.cc/FCA8-DC5J] (Ger.).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407.
202. Gervutz, supra note 197, at 471.
203. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation Committees,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639, 78 Fed. Reg. 4570 (Jan. 11, 2013); Order Approving
NASDAQ’s Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation Committees, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-68640, 78 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Jan. 11, 2013). See also Jesse M. Brill, Compensation
Committee and Advisor Independence Standards: Actions to Take Now, 27 CORP. EXEC. 1, 1
(2013).
204. Gervutz, supra note 197, at 474.
205. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Co-determination Act], §§ 1, 7, 27, 29 (Ger.).
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representatives tend to shy away from gratuitous executive compensation is
selfish, but rightfully so. Employee representatives are much more concerned
with direct executive-to-employee compensation comparisons than independent
committee members would be, as they might be on the wrong end of the equation
if they think their CEO is making money that should be going home with the
average worker instead. 210
The other aspect of German corporate governance that affects treatment of
executive compensation is the fact that the sections of the German Corporate
Governance Code (“GCGC”) are not technically binding, but merely
recommendations. 211 The GCGC operates on a “comply- or-explain” basis
where publicly-traded companies are only required to disclose to what extent
they have complied with GCGC recommendations and why they chose not to
comply with any recommendations. 212 If the GCGC issues recommendations
that do not produce satisfactory compliance, the German government has shown
a willingness to turn those recommendations into binding law, just as it did with
disclosure of individual compensation in the early 2000s. 213 The fact that the
GCGC is not technically binding allows companies to interpret corporate
governance recommendations in ways that suit the companies themselves,
instead of relying on the legislature to enact binding laws which apply across the
board for all types of businesses. 214 Instead of forcing companies to comply with
inflexible regulations, the GCGC allows companies to find what is best suited
for themselves and their stakeholders. 215 Additionally, this flexible corporate
governance environment allows the market to be the ultimate arbitrator when it
comes to approval of corporate actions. 216 Instead of relying on the government
to enact stricter regulations that force suitable corporate compliance, German
companies are inspired to act responsibly on their own merit or run the risk of
their shareholders leaving for greener pastures in the form of companies with
more appropriate corporate governance strategies. 217
While the Dodd-Frank Act has been slow to implement and, arguably,
ineffective, the German VorstAG represents the opposite end of the spectrum in
terms of efficacy and efficiency. The VorstAG set out to (1) increase
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transparency, (2) increase sustainability among compensation structures, and (3)
emphasize long-term company success and stability instead of immediate profits
in structuring compensation. 218 A study of the first three years of the VorstAG’s
implementation found that transparency increased dramatically with longer,
clearer, and more in-depth compensation discussions being released to
shareholders. 219 Early returns on sustainability and a shift in focus toward
extended success are inconclusive over such a short time period as they are both
long-term goals by nature. 220 However, the biggest mark of success is not a
quantitative figure. It is the fact that the public concern for executive
compensation in Germany has subsided. 221 The German government has moved
past executive compensation to other corporate governance issues, and German
newspapers rarely discuss executive compensation anymore, something that
cannot be said of their American counterparts. 222
Even without the immediate statistics to back up the success of the VorstAG,
the decrease in public concern suggests that the German government’s quick and
effective approach to tackling the issue of executive compensation through
increased transparency and a shift toward sustainability at the interest of the
companies themselves, and not the government that regulates them, achieved
what it set out to accomplish. While the U.S. struggles to implement corporate
governance guidelines a decade after the G20 Summit where executive
compensation was a main focus, the German government proposed and
implemented a successful plan in a few months’ time by giving German
companies guideposts to success instead of highly-regulated avenues to
compliance. What happened in Germany is evidence that more government
regulation might not be the ideal pathway to addressing corporate governance
issues. If the American government were to take a few pointers from their old
rivals across the Atlantic and implement something similar to the VorstAG, they
might be able to see if a system based on long-term success and sustainability,
instead of increased compliance, would lead to empowered companies and
shareholders being able to address their executives’ compensation on their own
terms. After years of failures as a result of stricter regulations, maybe the U.S.
could benefit from letting companies have a looser leash for once.
One of the goals of the SEC Pay Ratio disclosure is to tighten the wage gap
between the employees and employers, but it will most likely result only in
employee dissatisfaction, which will lead to lower worker morale and poor
performance. 223 This paper has illustrated that external influences such as

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Mathieu, supra note 177, at 636.
Id. at 636–38.
Id. at 637–38.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Cowherd & Levine, supra note 77, at 316.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

186

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:161

increased disclosure, shareholder proposals, and stricter tax regulations have
done little to help dispel the outrage surrounding executive compensation. In
fact, increased disclosure and stricter tax regulations have provided benchmarks
for executive compensation and produced great increases in executive pay.
Former-SEC Chairman Cox said that it is not the SEC’s job to decrease
executive compensation, and he is correct. 224 Considering how the increased
disclosure that goes along with the SEC Pay Ratio might cause more harm than
good, this begs the question: What is the point of placing stricter regulations on
companies if we already know they will not help?
The SEC Pay Ratio is supposed to guide shareholders in “say-on-pay”
proposals, but, even in the brief history of “say-on-pay”, it is evident that (1) the
advisory votes have little effect on executive compensation, and (2) shareholders
have little incentive to vote against executive compensation when they are better
suited selling their shares and walking away.
Shareholders have the ability to sell their stock at will, so they are naturally
less inclined to be involved in the governance of a corporation. The same can be
said of shareholders in Germany as it can in the U.S. However, German
executive compensation culture differentiates itself because employees are
much more tied to the organization than are the shareholders.
While shareholders are primarily concerned with stock price and the
changes in executive compensation that coincide with the market’s view of the
organization, employees are naturally inclined to be much more interested in the
allocation of the organization’s funds and the long-term health of the
organization as a product of their position. Shareholders have the option of
selling stock and pursuing greener pastures if corporate governance is not
suitable. If employees are unhappy about corporate governance in their current
organization, they are in a more difficult situation than unhappy shareholders.
Leaving one organization for a position in another is arguably more burdensome
than selling stock, particularly without a guarantee that the new position will be
in an organization any more favorable than the last.
It is suggested that the issue of executive compensation starts and ends with
those who determine it: the board of directors. However, as previously
illustrated, there is little to no incentive for those whose compensation is
determined by the company’s highest executives to decrease the pay of those
executives. 225
The lowest executive-to-average worker compensation rates in U.S. history
came during the 1940s, but the likely causes—increased union power and heavy
influence from social norms—cannot be replicated by external forces. 226 If the
U.S. is interested in solving its issue with executive compensation, I suggest that
224. See Nocera, supra note 124.
225. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 7.
226. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 106–07.
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the U.S. take a hint from their German counterparts and recommend employee
representation on compensation committees.
This would provide for greater influence from a body of stakeholders that
has inherent interest in the long-term wellbeing of the company and the
transparency of company-wide compensation. It has been shown that increased
transparency in compensation policies leads to increased firm performance. 227 A
quick way to increase transparency would be to have an employee representative
sitting at the table where compensation is determined, so that representative can
report the reasoning behind this determination to the employees they represent.
If employees are unhappy or compensation policies are not disclosed in a
transparent fashion, the employee representative acts as a direct link between an
employee population and those determining the compensation. Additionally,
this representative can act as both a simulation of the union pressure union
leaders held over executives in unionized industries in the 1940s and as a liaison
for the social factors that helped compress executive compensation in the past
but are now most likely ignored by directors whose primary concern is their own
paycheck.
Admittedly, one employee representative may not initially carry much
weight in compensation determinations. However, the point is not to give
employee representatives power that challenges that of shareholder
representatives as the supervisory boards in Germany do. 228 The point is to give
employees a seat at the bargaining table. Even if the shareholder representatives
initially ignore the employee representative, the fact that the employee
representative is present creates a direct line to the employee population. If the
shareholder representatives give no merit to the concerns of the employee
population, work production will suffer, and employees will feel inspired to pack
up their bags and look for a company where the shareholders care about
employee input.
In the end, an employee representative on the compensation committee has
the potential to increase transparency between executives and employees, which
has the potential to increase performance, increase stock price, and satisfy
shareholders. In order to satisfy disgruntled employees and increase company
performance, executives will have more incentive to take annual salary cuts in
favor of deferred compensation plans that relate to the company’s success.
Because deferred compensation plans receive favorable tax treatment,
executives might be able to take home the same amount of money after-tax while
not facing the pressure from employees due to the disgustingly large numbers
popping out of the proxy disclosures.
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Taking inspiration from the German VorstAG, the U.S. implementation of
employee representation on compensation committees should be a
recommendation, and not a binding requirement. The GCGC’s non-binding
nature allows companies to decide what is best for them and for their
shareholders. 229 The institution of two-tiered boards in Germany in combination
with mandatory employee representation gives companies greater power to
supervise their directors and decreases the need for costly external regulation.
American corporations are currently governed in such a way that the supervision
of directors is limited to regulation from the SEC or shareholder activism, which
is most often and most effectively exercised in the buying and selling of shares.
The open-ended recommendations from the GCGC and heightened involvement
from internal representatives through co-determination allow for a more
individualized form of governance that might produce lasting effects on
corporations that changing stock prices would not.
An article from the Brooklyn Journal of International Law compares the
GCGC’s approach at providing guideposts to corporate governance to the SEC’s
method of strictly limiting every avenue possible in saying that the SEC
“precisely defining every word removes space for innovation and the
opportunity to let companies (and ultimately the market) decide what works
well.” 230 The author continues in saying that the “open-ended reform” offered in
Germany
is critical for triggering the self-reflection needed to determine how to best
translate these general principles into practical measures. This kind of selfreflection, in turn, is in and of itself vital. For if, as companies say, the one-sizefits-all solution is too constraining, then they are in the best situation to
determine which solutions work best for them. 231

My suggestion is for the U.S. to explore the effects of employee
representation on compensation committees through corporate governance
recommendations. I think it would be beneficial for the American government
to take a detour from the typical highly-regulated SEC requirements and urge
public companies to handle the issues with executive compensation on their own
terms. The presence of an employee representative among compensation
committee members may not have a direct effect on the level of executive
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compensation, but giving employees a seat at the bargaining table will lessen the
disconnect between executives and employees the SEC set out to solve with the
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and open up discussion for more internal solutions
for compensation issues.
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